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ARTICLE 
TOO LATE IN THE GAME: HOW 
BALLOT MEASURES UNDERCUT 
CEQA 
BY JON RAINWATER* AND SUSAN STEPHENSON** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Take me out to the ball game" recently became the cam-
paign slogan for two critical development projects in San Fran-
cisco. Both of these development projects - a San Francisco 
Giants ballpark and a San Francisco 4gers football sta-
dium/shopping mall complex - were approved by the voters, in 
March, 1996, and June, 1997, respectively, and are now moving 
forward. 
Because the regulatory guidelines for the California 
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") contain an exemption for 
"the submittal of proposals to a vote of the people," both 
projects avoided environmental analysis after the board of 
supervisors and the electorate had given a green light for the 
projects. In this article, we will examine the possibility that 
* Jon Rainwater received his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley 
and currently works as the membership director of the California League of Conserva-
tion Voters. He is active in local environmental issues and serves on the board of the 
San Francisco League of Conservation Voters. 
** Susan Stephenson received her B.A. from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and currently works as national organizing director of the Headwaters 
Sanctuary Project. She is active in local environmental issues and serves on the board 
of San Francisco Tomorrow, an urban environmental organization. 
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the ballot measure exemption functions as a loophole that 
weakens the goal of early meaningful, analysis that is at the 
heart of CEQA. To. put the exemption in a specific 
environmental and political context, we will look at some of the 
environmental impacts of the two San Francisco stadium 
development projects as well as the campaigns for the 
stadiums. For historical context, we will also describe the 
origins of the ballot measure exemption and the case law 
surrounding it. Finally, we will briefly propose suggestions for 
reform. 
II. THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT 
In the early 1970's, as California experienced sustained 
economic and population growth, Californians grew concerned 
about a host of environmental problems - including traffic 
congestion, toxic contamination, decreasing air quality and 
water quality, and destruction of open space. Those concerns 
in turn led to a series of landmark environmental protection 
laws. l The California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") -
perhaps the most ambitious of those laws - was passed by the 
State Legislature in 1970 to "ensure that the long-term 
protection of the environment ... shall be the guiding criterion 
in public decision-making.,,2 
Modeled on the National Environmental Policy Act 
("NEPA"),3 CEQA requires "local agencies, regional agencies, 
and state agencies, boards, and commissions" to take 
environmental impacts into consideration in their actions.4 
CEQA has been interpreted as "requiring public agencies to 
deny approval of a project with significant adverse effects when 
feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures can 
1. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15378(b)(4) (1996) [hereinafter "CEQA Guide-
lines"]. The "CEQA Guidelines" begin in section 15000 of Title 14 of the California 
Code of Regulations. 0 
2. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West 1996). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
4. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000(g), 21001(0, (g) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). See 
CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002(b), 15020, 15367, 15368, 15369, 15383 (1996). 
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substantially lessen such effects.'l5 By requiring environmental 
concerns to guide development, CEQA revolutionized planning 
in California. It set up an open process that would give public 
agencies, project proponents, and the public a chance to fully 
assess the impact of development projects before approving 
them. This process utilizes the Environmental Impact Report 
("EIR") as the key tool in environmental decision-making.6 An 
. EIR as envisioned in CEQA would contain three main 
components: 1) a description of the environmental impacts of a 
projece 2) a determination as to whether there are feasible less 
environmentally harmful alternatives to the project8 and 3) and 
an analysis of ways of mitigating the harmful environmental 
effects of the projece. 
CEQA Administrative Guidelines10 and case lawll 
emphasize that the "EIRs should be done as early in the 
planning process as possible to enable environmental 
considerations to influence project, program or design.,,12 
Courts describe the preparation of EIRs prior to approval of 
proposed projects as the "heart of the environmental control 
process,,13 and as simply the "heart of CEQA.,,14 In fact, 
untimely EIRs have been disapproved of because they can 
5. Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 222 Cal. App. 3d 30, 41(1990). 
6. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1996). Details of the EIR process are 
set forth in sections 15080-15096 of Title 14 of the California Administrative Code. 
7. See id. 
8. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (a) (West 1996); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14 
§ 15121(a). The content requirements for EIRs generally are set forth at §§ 15120-
15132 of the Administrative Code. 
9. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (a) (West 1996). 
10. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004(b). 
11. See, e.g., Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 
168 (Cal. 1982); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975); 
Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist, 235 Cal. App. 3d 772, 780 
(1991); Mount Sutro Defense Comm. v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 77 Cal. App. 3d 20, 35 
(1978). 
12. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1030, n. 7. 
13. County ofInyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 192 (1977). 
14. Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 
182, 190 (1996). See also CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 14 § 15003; Citizens of Goleta Valley v. 
Board of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 
P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974); San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San 
Francisco 151 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72 (1984). 
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become "post hoc rationalizations" to support action already 
taken."15 
This requirement of early environmental analysis conflicts 
with the single provision in the CEQA Guidelines that exempts 
ballot measures. When an EIR is done for an environmentally 
sensitive project well after the voters and municipal authorities 
have embraced the project, can the EIR really be objective and 
timely? Or does the exemption become, especially when project 
proponents for financial resources and political clout, a way of 
ensuring that EIRs are done "too late in the game" to have 
meaningful impact? In these cases, is CEQA's mandate to 
"ensure that the long-term protection of the environment ... 
shall be the guiding criterion in public decision making" being 
circumvented?16 
III. REGULATORY BASIS FOR CEQA'S BALLOT 
MEASURE EXEMPTION 
The original intention of the CEQA exemption for ballot 
measures is unclear. The exemption is not found in CEQA's 
statutory language, but in the CEQA Guidelines. The 
Guidelines are not part of the statute passed by the 
Legislature, but are promulgated by the state Resources 
Agency to aid local agencies in implementation of CEQA. The 
Guidelines in section 15378(b)(4) - originally adopted as 
section 15037 in 1973 - simply state that the "submittal of 
proposals to a vote of the people" is not to be considered a 
"project" as defined by CEQA and therefore is not subject to the 
CEQA review process. Like all sections of the CEQA 
Guidelines, the ballot measure exception is not binding on the 
courts, but the Guidelines are generally given "significant 
weight."17 The California Supreme Court, however, has held 
15. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278 
(Cal. 1988). See also, No Oil, 529 P.2d, at 74. 
16. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West 1996). 
17. Guardians of Turlock's Integrity v. Turlock City Council, 149 Cal. App. 3d 584, 
594-595 (1984); City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove, 100 Cal. App. 3d 521, 530 
(1979). 
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that the Guidelines should not be followed when a provision is 
erroneous or clearly unauthorized.18 
The courts have also at times recommended a loose 
approach to specific provisions of the CEQA Guidelines, one 
where the Guidelines "are subject to a construction of 
reasonableness,,19 and are "distinguishable from standards that 
frequently require a rigid and precise application . . . [and] 
have only general application to the diversity of projects 
undertaken or approved by public agencies. »20 
Since the CEQA environmental review process only applies 
to "projects," this section of the Guidelines suggests the 
possibility that ballot measures - including those approving 
what would otherwise be a project under CEQA - would be 
considered exempt from CEQA and CEQA's environmental 
review process.21 
CEQA defmes a "project" as "an activity which may cause 
either a direct physical change in the environment, or a 
reasonably foreseeable indirect change in the environment.'~2 
The "submittal of proposals to a vote of the people of the state 
or of a particular community,,23 is found in a short list of 
activities that "are not projects" in section 15378 of the CEQA 
Guidelines. 
This section of the guidelines also excludes from the 
definition of project "proposals for legislation to be enacted by 
the State Legislature, ,,24 "continuing administrative or 
maintenance activities, such as purchases of supplies, 
personnel-related actions, general policy and procedure 
18. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 
278, 282, n. 2 (1988). 
19. Rural Landowners Ass'n v. Lodi City Council, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1021-
1022 (1983). 
20. Las Virgenes Homeowners Fed'n, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App. 
3d 300, 306, fn. 1 (1986). 
21. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458, 460 (1980). 
22. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996). 
23. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(4). 
24. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(2). 
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making,,,25 and "the creation of government funding 
mechanisms or other government fiscal activities which do not 
involve any commitment to any specific project.1I26 
When read in context, the exceptions made for "not-projects" 
seem to be borne out of an effort to avoid encumbering basic 
governmental procedures that "do not involve commitment to 
any specific [development] project" by the CEQA review 
process. The CEQA Guidelines' practical concern for efficient 
function of government can devolve, when misapplied, into a 
blanket exemption for environmentally sensitive projects that 
happen to appear on the ballot. This loophole in the law allows 
developers of potentially popular projects to use a ballot 
measure to avoid or delay environmental review until well 
after significant political and economic momentum has been 
built through political sloganeering that tends to be long on 
emotional appeal and short on objective fact. This "greasing of 
the skids" turns the EIR - if and when it is finally done - into 
exactly the type of "post-hoc rationalization" that the courts 
have repeatedly condemned. 
The application of the ballot exemption to specific 
development projects is largely a product of the somewhat 
murky interpretations of the guidelines found in the 
surrounding case law, to which we now turn. 
IV. CASELAW INTERPRETING CEQA'S BALLOT 
MEASURE EXEMPTION 
A. YOUNGER v. LAFCO: LIMITING THE EXEMPTION'S SCOPE 
In Younger v. LAFCO, the very first case which discusses 
the CEQA Guidelines' exemption for ballot measures, the Court 
of Appeal remarks on the code section's "ambiguous 
language.'>27 A Local Agency Formation Committee of San 
Diego County ("LAFCO") had approved for a vote a proposal to 
25. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(3). 
26.CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(5). 
27. [d. 
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deannex twenty-five square miles of territory In the 
southwestern corner of San Diego County.28 The Court of 
Appeal had to determine whether the deannexation proposal 
was a "project" subject to CEQA and EIR requirements even 
though that project might qualify for the ballot measure 
exemption. The Younger court found that it was a project, 
despite the fact that the deannexation proposal would be voted 
on by the electorate. The court held that when a vote of the 
people is a stage in the approval process for a project that has a 
potential impact on the environment, the ballot measure 
exemption does not apply. 
The court explained: 
the "project" here is "more than the submittal of propos-
als to a vote of the people." Rather, it is but the first 
step. . . with consequent substantial impact on the 
physical and human environment ... If LAFCO disap-
proves the deannexation proposal, it cannot come to a 
vote. 
It is true the deannexation petition ... is but a step in a 
series of activities that mayor may not occur; but these 
activit~es may culminate in a project which will change 
and affect the environment .... [T]he word "project" ap-
pears to emphasize activities culminating in physical 
changes to the environment .... In environment, di-
rectly or ultimately.29 (emphasis in original). 
2B. See id. In the Younger case, the LAFCO had detennined that because the pro-
posed deannexation "amounted to a change in governmental jurisdiction" that no EIR 
was required. Younger, Bl Cal. App. 3d at 467. The state of California and the City of 
San Diego both sought a writ of mandate to compel LAFCO to prepare an EIR. See id. 
at 46B. It is an interesting historical note that in this seminal case on the CEQA ballot 
exemption, the plaintiffs were the state and a major city - San Diego. They sought to 
compel LAFCO, basically a small agency following the wishes of a citizens' group sup-
porting the deannexation, the Border Area Citizens for Deannexation, to complete an 
EIR prior to placing a project on the ballot. Subsequent history will show that many, if 
not most, cities strongly support blanket CEQA exemptions for ballot measures against 
the wishes of citizen groups concerned about the environmental impacts of projects 
placed on the ballot. 
29. Younger, Bl Cal. App. 3d at 479 (citing Bozung v. Local Agency Fonnation 
Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 279 (1975). 
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The Younger court concluded that: 
where there is a reasonable possibility that a project or 
activity may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment, an exemption would be improper .... We conclude 
a petition for deannexation is a project that does not fall 
within the specified exemptions although one step in the 
entire process requires submittal of the deannexation 
question to the voters of the County of San Diego.3o 
In Younger, the Court of Appeal recognized what should be 
obvious: In cases where the electorate is called on to "approve" 
projects with potentially significant environmental impacts, the 
electorate deserves the benefit of the environmental analysis 
that the CEQA process affords. The court wrote that an EIR 
prepared prior to the vote "would be available to assist the 
public in exercising its vote.'.al This sensible approach balances 
the guidelines' exemption with the larger statutory and public 
policy goals of CEQA analysis. This approach protects what a 
number of courts have described as CEQA's dual purpose of 
affording both "the fullest possible protection of the 
environment,.a2 and "informed self-government.I>33 Given the 
sensitive nature of the two stadium projects along San 
Francisco's bayfront, "informed self-government would 
certainly have benefited if an EIR had been "available to assist 
the public in exercising its vote.,.a4 
B. STEIN V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA: CITIZENS VERSUS AGENCY 
SPONSORED INITIATIVES 
In Stein v. City of Santa Monica, the Court of Appeal sought 
to determine whether the city's act of placing a rent control 
ordinance on the ballot in response to a citizen petition was a 
30. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 479-80 (citing Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 553 
P.2d 537 (1976). 
31. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 481. 
32. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 
1990). 
33. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 
283 (Cal. 1988). 
34. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 481. 
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"project" contemplated by CEQA, and therefore required 
environmental review.35 The court found that the initiative did 
not become a "project" under CEQA when the city placed it on 
the ballot.36 
In its discussion, the court cited CEQA language that 
defines "projects" subject to CEQA's environmental 
investigation to include " ... discretionary projects proposed to 
be carried out or approved by public agencies ... " but not " ... 
ministerial projects proposed to be carried out or approved by 
public agencies .... "J7 The Stein court found that "the acts of 
placing the issues on the ballot and certifying the result as a 
charter amendment qualifies as a nondiscretionary ministerial 
act not contemplated by CEQA,'.as given that the sponsors filed 
a legally sound petition and the city had no choice but to certify 
the petition and place it on the ballot.39 
The Stein decision also cites CEQA statutory language 
which defmes a project as "activities directly undertaken by 
any public agency.,,40 It distinguishes between the initiative, 
which it calls an "an activity undertaken by the e1ectorate,~1 
and activities undertaken by a "public agency" as defined in 
CEQA.42 
The Resources Agency highlighted a critical point here 
when they revised the ballot exemption section of the 
guidelines to include a direct citation to Stein.43 This citation 
35. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1980). In this case, a 
group oflandlords called Santa Monica for Renters' Rights sought writ of prohibition or 
mandate seeking to block the implementation and enforcement of the rent control 
charter amendment. The initiative was placed on the ballot by a petition signed by 
15% of registered voters and was passed as "Proposition A" by the electorate of Santa 
Monica on April 10, 1979. See id. 
36. See id. at 460. 
37. [d.; CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21080(a), (b)(l) (West 1996). 
38. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461. See also Norwood Homes, Inc. v. Town of Mor-
aga, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 1206 (1989). 
39. See Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461. 
40. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 460; CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996). 
41. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461. 
42. See CAL. PuB. RES. Code § 21063 (West 1996). 
43. See CEQA Guidelines, § 15378 (b)(4). 
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must be seen as an attempt to resolve the "ambiguous 
language" of the ballot measure exemption noted in the 
Younger decision.44 Why precisely did they cite to Stein? Stein 
hinges on the distinction between a "non-discretionary 
ministerial act not contemplated by CEQA'145 of certifying "an 
activity undertaken by the electorate,146 on the one hand, and 
discretionary acts by public agencies on the other. The Stein 
citation in the guidelines indicates that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the current guidelines is that they apply only 
to non-discretionary citizen-sponsored initiatives where the city 
has no choice but to put the measure on the ballot. Certainly, a 
vote by the Board of Supervisors choosing to place on the ballot 
a measure for a development project on environmentally 
sensitive land would fall into the discretionary category in this 
scheme, thus triggering CEQA review. 
If the courts and public agencies had applied Stein's narrow 
interpretation, the potential for abuse of the ballot measure 
exemption would have been minima1.47 
C. FULLERTON JOINT HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT V. STATE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION: CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION 
In Fullerton Joint Union High School District v. State Board 
of Education,48 the high school district sought a writ of 
mandate to prevent an election to approve the creation of a new 
school district out of part of the existing district. The petition 
44. See Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 473. 
45. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461. 
46. [d. 
47. There is case law suggesting that agencies and the courts should feel bound to 
Stein's limited interpretation of the ballot measure exemption, exempting only the 
ministerial act of certifying for election a citizen-sponsored initiative. In Williams u. 
Garcetti, the California Supreme Court held that "[wlhere changes have been intro-
duced to a statute by amendment it must be assumed that the changes have a purpose 
... [which may likely bel to clarify the true meaning of the statute." Williams v. Gar-
cetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993) (citations omitted). What meaning could the inclu-
sion of Stein have but to equate the ballot measure exemption with a somewhat narrow 
exemption for citizen-sponsored initiatives? 
48. Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168 (Cal. 
1982). 
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by the Fullerton HSD argued that the state Board of Education 
illegally failed to follow CEQA procedures before placing the 
matter before the voters. The Superior Court found that CEQA 
h~d been violated and barred the election.49 The State Board of 
Education then appealed the decision.50 
In the appeal, the California Supreme Court was asked to 
decide whether CEQA applied to the Board of Education's 
decision to place this matter before the voters.51 The Court 
issued a ringing endorsement of the voters' right to 
environmental analysis before voting on a proposa1.52 The 
Court wrote that the Board's decision is "not exempt from 
CEQA merely because that approval must be ratified by the 
voters.,,53 The decision then goes on to say: 
In the present setting, the State Board and the voters 
are the decision-makers; they must decide whether to 
approve the proposed secession, an approval which nec-
essarily entails building a new high school and other ac-
tions which may have an environmental effect. In mak-
ing that decision, the State Board and the voters should 
have the benefit of relevant environmental data and 
analysis.54 
The reasoning is crystal clear. The vote by the people is a 
"first step. . . with consequent substantial impact on the 
environment,,55 or is "an essential step leading to 
environmental impact,,,56 requiring some formal environmental 
assessment before the vote. This common sense approach 
acknowledges that when voters "approve" a project, the 
electorate is serving a planning and decision-making function, 
and has just as much right to the environmental data 
49. See id. at 179-80. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. Fullerton, 654 P.2d at 181. 
54. [d. at 183. 
55. [d. at 179-80 (citing Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 479). 
56. [d. at 179-80. 
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represented by CEQA analysis as any other planning body. 
This type of review might be especially useful in the case of 
high profile, well-publicized, contentious election battles - like 
those for the two San Francisco stadiums. 
D. LEE V. CITY OF LOMPOC:57 WIDENING THE EXEMPrION 
So far, in the first three cases we have discussed, the courts 
have taken an approach to the ballot measure exemption that 
balances the exemption with the broader context of the critical 
environmental analysis purpose of CEQA. The Lee court chose 
a more literal and categorical interpretation of the ballot 
measure exemption. This created the possibility that the ballot 
measure exemption could be used as a political tool to 
circumvent early CEQA analysis in favor of a pro-forma EIR, 
after a voter "mandate" and political and economic momentum 
had built behind the project. 
As with Stein, the court in Lee was asked to determine 
whether environmental review was required under CEQA 
when the city council placed a ballot measure before the 
electorate.58 Unlike Stein, however, the measure put before the 
electorate was not brought by a citizens' petition,59 and unlike 
Stein, the court in Lee did not find that CEQA's distinction 
between between a city council's ministerial duties and its 
discretionary acts applied to the ballot measure exemption.so 
The Lee court reasoned that the city council's discretionary 
decision to place the measure on the ballot did not qualify as a 
57. Lee v. City of Lompoc, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1515 (1993). 
58. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1515. The Lompoc City Council had placed on the 
ballot a project to build a shopping center and to amend its general plan and specific 
plans and zoning ordinance. After the voters approved the measure, the petitioners 
filed suit to set aside the election results. The trial court denied the petition and the 
Court of Appeal (Second District) affirmed the lower court. 
59. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523. The Lee court claimed that the ballot ex-
emption "does not distinguish between submittal of ballot measures by a public agency 
from those submitted by voter initiative petitions," missing that the guidelines had 
been amended to include a citation to Stein. In fact, the Lee decision mistakenly as-
serts that the ballot measure exemption in section 15378 "has never been amended." 
[d. 
60. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523. 
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"project" because the decision was not an "approval" within the 
meaning of CEQA.61 The court wrote that "the City Council's 
resolution to place the matter on the ballot did not constitute 
an "approval" under CEQA because it did not commit the 
Council to a definite course of action.,,62 This line of reasoning 
directly conflicts with the reasoning in Younger and Fullerton 
- that CEQA applies to a ballot measure if it could eventually 
culminate in a change to the environment. 
The Lee court also took a very different approach to the 
"informed self-government',sa aspects of CEQA that Fullerton 
and Younger saw as mandating EIR analysis prior to non-
citizen-sponsored measures. In fact, the Lee court seems to 
denigrate the importance of the environmental issues 
surrounding an EIR and the voters' interest in such issues. 
The Lee decision, in fact, ends by quoting with approval the 
trial court's words that theses issues " ... are not the kind of 
informational blockbusters which would be expected to affect 
the lay voter. »64 
The Lee court's rejection of requiring the CEQA process for 
ballot measures placed before the electorate relies on a 
somewhat convoluted and legalistic argument. The court 
reasoned that CEQA: 
requires the "lead agency,,s5 to certify that the final EIR 
has been completed in compliance with CEQA ... and 
that the decision-making body reviewed and considered 
... the final EIR prior to approving the project. There is 
no way a lead agency could certify that the electorate 
considered the information in the EIR prior to approv-
ing the project.66 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 
283 (Cal. 1988). 
64. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524. 
65. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524. "Lead agency" is defmed in CEQA Guidelines 
§ 15367; see also CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21067 (West 1996). 
66. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524. 
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Therefore, because the "lead agency" has no way of going 
out and determining if each voter has read and considered the 
EIR in full, the Lee court would deny the electorate as a whole 
the opportunity for what Fullerton called "the benefit of 
relevant environmental data and analysis.'>67 
Lee misses what Younger and Fullerton see clearly: the 
electorate and the public agency are both decision-makers, and 
the consideration of an EIR is not an either/or process. 
Environmental analysis benefits the public agency in deciding 
whether to "approve" the project. And it benefits the formal 
"lead agency" in fully considering the project's environmental 
impacts, alternatives to the project,68 and mitigation of 
negative environmental impacts.69 
Arguments by development project proponents and planning 
agencies that both citizen-sponsored and agency-sponsored 
ballot measures are exempt from CEQA prior to a vote of the 
people thus rest squarely on the Lee decision. In this context it 
is ironic to note that the facts of the Lee case do not lend 
themselves to such a broad interpretation of Lee. In fact, in Lee 
the city council had prepared an EIR on the development 
project but were deadlocked on whether or not to approve the 
project. The city council's inability to reach a decision caused 
them to seek to resolve the impasse by placing the matter 
before the voters.70 Thus, a specific case where a public agency 
placed a development measure before the voters after a 
certified EIR was prepared has become the main precedent for 
legal arguments that no EIR process is required prior to a vote 
of the people for any and all ballot measures.71 
67. Fullerton, 654 P.2d at 179-180. 
68. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1996); CEQA Guidelines, 
§§ 15002(A)(3), 15021(A)(2), (c), 15041(a), 15063(c)(2), see also Sierra Club v. State Bd. 
of Forestry, 876 P.2d 505, 516-17 (Cal. 1994). 
69. See CEQA Guidelines § 15370. 
70. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1518. 
71. See Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Albany, 56 Cal. App. 4th 
1199 (1997). This recent case, handed down while this article was written, follows Lee 
in precisely this way. In this case, the petitioners sought writ of mandate and declara-
tory relief against the city and gambling companies after passage of a ballot measure 
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v. THE STAKES OF THE GAME: ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACTS OF SAN FRANCISCO'S PROPOSED STADIUMS 
In San Francisco, the Board of Supervisors placed two 
measures on the ballot in 1996 and 1997 for large development 
projects that· clearly would have significant environmental 
impacts. 
The first was Proposition B, on the ballot in March of 1996. 
It contained a proposal for a 42,OOO-seat baseball stadium for 
the San Francisco Giants at China Basin along with an 
ancillary retail and commercial structure. The proposed site 
could hardly be more environmentally sensitive - downtown 
and on the waterfront. Along with the complexities of a major 
development in an urban center, the city would have to take 
into consideration the sensitive bayside location of the project 
- including the impact on the bird and aquatic life in the Bay 
and Channel area. 
Proposition B amended the City Planning Code to establish 
development standards for the proposed Giants ballpark at the 
China Basin site. The measure also directed the city to adopt 
conforming amendments to the city's General Plan and all 
other relevant state, regional, and local codes and plans.72 In 
addition, the measure created the Northeast China Basin 
Special Use District, adopted as Section 249[18] of the City 
Planning Code. 
pennitting cardroom gaming at a horse track located on the waterfront. The Superior 
Court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeal affinned in part and reversed in 
part. Without much discussion, the case adopts Lee's blanket application of the guide-
lines' ballot measure exemption - even going so far as to cite Lee's mistaken contention 
that the ballot measure exemption in the guidelines "has never been amended." [d. at 
109 (citing Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523). The Court of Appeal, however, in this recent 
decision did hold that the ballot measure was subject to CEQA review because it in-
cluded a detailed development agreement between the city and the cardroom developers 
with details about the development. See id. at 116. This is an important point because 
just these types of details about how specific development projects were to be carried 
out were included in the ballot measures placed before San Francisco voters. Unfortu-
nately, the Court of Appeal failed to see that that this sort of "planning before envi-
ronmental review" could take place without a legally binding development agreement. 
In fact, in the case of measure F (Land Use measure for the 4gers' stadium), it was 
negotiated and placed directly in the initiative rather than in the development agree-
ment. See id. 
72. San Francisco, California, Proposition B, Section 8 (June 1997 ballot). 
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The second project was another proposal for a sports arena 
- this one to build a new 75,000-seat 4gers football stadium at 
Candlestick Point along with a 1.4 billion square feet 
"MegaMall"73 shopping and entertainment complex. This 
project would again be built right on the waterfront, impacting 
sensitive wildlife habitat, open space, and the Candlestick 
Point Recreation Area. The project would also impact the 
human environment, adding thousands of cars to the adjacent 
Highway 101. 
The 4gers' stadium/mall proposal was contained in two 
ballot measures in San Francisco's June 1997 election?4 
Proposition D included approval for the city to sell up to $100 
million in lease revenue bonds to finance part of the stadium. 
Proposition F was a land-use measure that created a special 
district at Candlestick point for the stadium/mall 
development.75 It also included language expediting the 
approval of any "permitted use" of the special district, 
instructing the Planning Commission to approve all 
applications that fit the guidelines contained within the ballot 
language and to take final action on all applications "within 60 
days of its first public hearing on the application."76 
These two projects had a particularly wide range of 
potential environmental impacts. The size and public nature of 
the projects, along with their sensitive bayside settings, created 
a particularly broad range of potential environmental impacts. 
The new stadiums (and mall) could create an increase in traffic 
along with potentially significant air quality impacts. 
Potential impacts on aquatic ecology were implicated by the 
stadiums' locations adjacent to San Francisco Bay. Industrial 
73. Ironically, although the term "MegaMall" was used frequently by project op-
ponents during the initiative campaign, the term itself was created as a positive mar-
keting term by the Mills Corporation, one of three partners in the $200 million mall 
project attached to the stadium proposal. 
74. Proposition D was placed on the ballot by the San Francisco Board of Supervi-
sors. Proposition F was placed on the ballot by the Mayor without public hearings. A 
special election was called for the measures, which took place in June, 1997. 
75. San Francisco, California, Proposition F Section 5, which added § 249.19 to 
Part II, Chapter II of the San Francisco Municipal Code (City Planning Code). 
76. SAN FRANCISCO MUNI. CODE § 249.19 (5) (1997). 
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uses in the area of the China Basin ballpark led to serious toxic 
remediation issues that had to be dealt with. Finally, the fact 
that the proposed location for each stadium was right on the 
Bay created potentially significant impacts on open space and 
recreational use of the land. 
A. TRAFFIC AND AIR QUALITY 
Perhaps the most obvious impact of the two stadium 
projects is increased traffic and traffic congestion. For 
example, a game with a capacity crowd at the proposed Giants 
ballpark would generate about 18,500 auto trips with an 
average trip length of 25.2 miles.77 The greatest impacts would 
be felt after some or all of the approximately thirteen weekday 
afternoon games each season. Between 3:30 and 4:30 p.m., the 
level of service at nineteen or more of the sixty-six intersections 
would deteriorate to the point of causing "excessive delays.,,78 
During these periods, parking needs would also escalate, 
impacting the on-street parking in surrounding neighborhoods 
and businesses. 
Increased traffic means, of course, increased air pollution. 
The Giants ballpark project would result in increases of the two 
pollutants that are precursors to "smog" or ozone pollution: 
reactive organic compounds (ROG) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx).79 The project would also result in increases in PMlO 
particulate pollution.80 Both particulates and ozone have 
serious health effects including increased risk of respiratory 
ailments as well as an increase in premature deaths. 
The Giants ballpark project· would also lead to violations of 
state and federal Carbon Monoxide standards.81 The 
incremental increase in Carbon Monoxide emissions caused by 
77. See Giants Ballpark Draft Environmental Impact Report [hereinafter "DEIR"I, 
IV at 267. 
78. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 144. 
79. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, Figure IV.G.1 at 268. Proposed Project Vehicular 
Emissions compared to Existing 3Com Park Vehicular Emissions. 
80. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 267 - 270. 
81. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, Table IV.G.2 at '275. Local Carbon Monoxide Con-
centrations. 
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the project is particularly pronounced when compared to local 
background air quality because game-day traffic increases lead 
to low travel speeds and therefore significantly more air 
pollution in the vicinity of the ballpark.82 
B. LAND USE AND OPEN SPACE 
The San Francisco General Plan contains prOVISIons for 
Recreation and Open Space as a central element in guiding the 
land use policies for San Francisco.sa Key portions of it would 
seem to preclude a development of the size, scope and nature of 
the Giants' proposed ballpark. 
The General Plan calls for a "citywide system of high quality 
public open space.,,s4 It also calls for "continuous public open 
space along the shoreline unless public access clearly conflicts 
with . . . uses requiring a waterfront location.,,s5 The Plan 
further states that "industry or commercial uses that are not 
dependent upon use ofthe water should not be permitted."s6 
The General Plan also includes specific provisions for open 
space development at specific locations. The policy for the 
creation of a South Beach Small Boat Harbor and Park calls for 
the development of a "six or seven acre public park and small 
boat marina east of the Embarcadero Roadway." 
How do development projects such as the two proposed 
stadiums penetrate such an apparent impasse of established 
development guidelines? In the case of the Giants stadium, 
language was placed in the ballot measure that directed the 
Board of Supervisors, Planning Commission and other officials 
to amend the city's General Plan and other codes and 
82. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 274. 
83. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 3. 
84. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objective 2, 
as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5. 
85. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objective 3, 
as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5. 
86. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objectives 
2 and 3, as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5. 
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ordinances in a manner consistent with the intent to build the 
stadium expressed in Proposition B.87 
As directed by the passage of Proposition B, the city's 
Planning Department developed a number of amendments to 
the general plan that would (1) nullify any requirements for 
development projects that contradicted the proposals in 
Proposition B, and (2) introduce specific enabling language and 
exemptions for the Giants ballpark. This type of piecemeal 
editing of a general plan to expedite a particular project is in 
itself troubling. The specific amendments threaten a number 
of central planning and urban design issues contained in the 
general plan including: 1) the preservation of sunlight in open 
spaces, 2) public access to shoreline areas, and 3) keeping 
structures low along the waterfront to allow views of the Ocean 
and Bay. Ironically, these amendments, arguably weakening 
urban environmental guidelines, were considered and approved 
as part of the "environmental review" process for the 
ballpark.88 
1. Sunlight in Parks and Open Space 
The Giants ballpark project would clearly violate Objective 
2, Policy 3, of the Recreation and Open Space Element of the 
General Plan adopted pursuant to Proposition B. This 
provision calls for: 
Objective 2, Policy 3: A number of other open spaces are 
under jurisdiction of other public agencies, or are pri-
vately owned and therefore not protected by the Charter 
amendments. These spaces should be given other forms 
of protection to assure they are not shaded during the 
hours of their most intensive use. Any new shading 
should be remedied to the extent feasible by expanding 
87. The provision is contained in "Objective 2 Policy 3 of the Recreation and Open 
Space Element of the General Plan." The amendment creating an exemption tailor-
made for the ballpark was contained in Proposition B, Section 8, approved by the vot-
ers of San Francisco, March, 1996. 
88. Commissions OK EIR at Mayor's Urging, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 27, 
1997, at p. AI. The amendments were approved at the same joint meeting of the Rede-
velopment Agency and Planning Commission certifying the EIR. See id. 
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opportunities for public assembly and recreation in in-
door and outdoor settings.89 
2. Open Space Along the Waterfront 
The Ballpark plan also clearly violates the provisions in the 
Plan for public open space along the waterfront. Furthermore, 
it conflicts with the proposal for a small boat harbor. 
Therefore, Proposition B's mandate to amend the General Plan 
to fit plans for the Ballpark includes the following: 
Objective 3: A 4.8 acre shoreline park is proposed at 
Rincon Point, and a 6.8 acre South Beach park is being 
developed at the base of Second Street adjacent to South 
Beach Harbor as part of the Rincon Point-South Beach 
Redevelopment project, with appropriate transitions to 
the ballpark and its overlooks. The ballpark will provide 
public access along its waterfront edge and connect the 
Embarcadero promenade (Herb Caen Way) with Lefty 
O'Doul Bridge along China Basin.90 
3. Size and Scale of Waterfront Development 
Finally, the sheer bulk of the stadium conflicts with a 
number of features of the Urban Design Element of the 
General Plan, including an explicit 40-ft. height limit for new 
buildings,91 as well as a guideline calling for low buildings 
along the waterfront. As in the above cases, Proposition B 
required the Planning Commission to write specific exemptions 
for the ballpark into the language of the General Plan: 
Objective 3, Section l.D: Low buildings along the water-
front contribute to the gradual tapering of height from 
hilltops to water that is characteristic of San Francisco 
and allows views of the Ocean and Bay. Larger, taller 
buildings providing places of public assembly and rec-
89. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 2. 
90. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 3. 
91. Objective 3 Map 4, Urban Design Guidelines for Height of New Buildings. San 
Francisco General Plan. 
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reation may be appropriate along the waterfront if they 
provide unique overviews or vistas that include portions 
that are publicly accessible during daytime and eve-
nings, and provide maximum feasible access to the 
shoreline.92 
The language in Proposition B circumventing these 
principles of urban design and planning through an initiative 
approving a specific development project sets a worrisome 
precedent. Instead of the project being tailored to be consistent 
with the city's general plan, the general plan itself was tailored 
to allow a well-funded development project to go forward. Will 
the city continue to allow politically expedient projects to run 
roughshod over its own development guidelines? 
C. TOXIC CONTAMINATION AND AQUATIC LIFE: OF HERRING AND 
HEAVY METALS 
The proposed location for the Giants' Ballpark had been an 
industrial site for over 100 years. As a result, the land was 
contaminated with toxics of multiple varieties, from coal-tar 
and petroleum products to chemicals, paints, and heavy 
metals.93 Soil samples at the project site were found to contain 
chemicals exceeding regulatory hazardous waste standards.94 
The twelve months of construction for the project would 
uncover large areas of soi1.95 Rain and water used for 
construction purposes (like dust control) would fall on the soil, 
washing the toxic-laden dirt into China Basin Channe1.96 The 
increased turbidity of the water in the Bay could decrease 
sunlight underwater, hindering photosynthesis, and introduce 
concentrated toxics, potentially resulting in an increased 
accumulation of toxics in the biota.97 And toxics currently 
buried under the Bay floor would be churned up by the huge 
92. Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 5. 
93. See George Cothran, Foul Play, S.F. WEEKLY, Oct 1-7,1997, at p.12. 
94. See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 298. 
95. See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 306. 
96. See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 306. 
97. See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 307. 
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support columns to be driven deep into the underwater soiL98 
Tidal action could move buried pollutants from the site into the 
China Basin Channel and the Bay. 
The EIR also points out the economic importance of the 
Pacific herring (Clupea harengus pallasi), and the possibility 
that toxic sediment released by construction at the site would 
interfere with the herring spawning at the mouth of China 
Basin by suffocating eggs laid there, and causing abnormalities 
in the surviving fish.99 
Had this information been made available through an EIR 
performed prior to the election, the project may have seen 
opposition from an entirely new sector: the fishing industry. 
San Francisco's general plan contained a clear vision for the 
Pier 46B area (the Ballpark site): it was to be used for "a Port 
maintenance facility and other maritime uses."lOO Not only 
would the Ballpark project not be a maritime use, it would 
threaten an important maritime use of the entire area by 
killing fish. But this posed no problem for the Giants. This 
troublesome section would simply be crossed out, voided, and 
replaced by specific language calling for the development of a 
ballpark written right into the general plan.101 
D. POST-ELECTION EIRs: A FAST-TRACK CEQA PROCESS? 
As the Guide to the California Environmental Quality Act 
points out: 
In the more than 25 years since the enactment of 
CEQA, the environmental review process has also be-
come a means by which the public interacts with deci-
sion-makers in developing policies affecting the envi-
ronment. Thus, the California Supreme Court has 
98. George Cothran, Foul Play, S.F. WEEKLY, Oct 1-7, 1997, at p.12. 
99. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 307. 
100. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 10. 
101. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 10. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/6
1998] TOO LATE IN THE GAME 421 
stated that the CEQA process 'protects not only the en-
vironment, but informed self-government.,I02 
Despite all of these potentially significant environmental 
impacts, no Environmental Impact Report (and for that matter, 
no formal environmental analysis) would be completed until 
well after voter approval of the ballpark and stadium projects 
- long after key decisions would be made about the scope of the 
projects. This fact in itself undermines the informed self-
government function of CEQA. 
Because no environmental analysis had been done, both the 
Supervisors who placed the measures on the ballot and the 
public who voted on them were denied the very information 
that would have been required had any other "decision-making 
body" been faced with the approval or disapproval of the 
stadium projects were they not on the ballot. 
In the case of the 4gers stadium and mall, the only 
information the public received on the potential adverse affects 
on air quality, traffic, and pollution was in short statements in 
the ballot handbook placed by groups opposed to the project, 
and in one mail piece put out by environmental groups.loa 
Since the cost of placing arguments in the ballot is high and 
based on a per-word charge ($200 + $2 per word in San 
Francisco), the statements tended to be very short and general. 
Furthermore, since no formal environmental review had been 
commissioned by the city, those discussing the potentially 
harmful impacts had very little data with which to work. If an 
EIR had been available, its findings could have been brought 
into the debate as concrete, objective data. Instead, the vast 
majority of information the public received was in the form of 
102. MICHAEL REMY, ET AL., GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
ACT 2 (1996) (citing Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, ("Goleta II") 52 
Cal. 3d 553, 564 (1990)). 
103. Campaign mail from the Sierra Club and the San Francisco League of Conser-
vation Voters addressed the environmental problems associated with the stadium-mall 
project. The piece urged a "Non vote on Propositions D and F because of "increased 
traffic and air pollution, destruction of open space and state parkland, and habitat 
destruction." This mailer was sent to 15,000 voters. (Campaign materials on file with 
the authors). 
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campaign materials, mostly from the pro-stadium/mall 
campaign, which spent more than $2 million to inundate the 
electorate with glossy campaign literature, an amount 
equivalent to approximately $33 a vote.104 
But the fact that the voters and the Board of Supervisors 
were denied the opportunity to examine environmental data 
before voting is not the only problem. Equally important, the 
post-election environmental review process would face such 
political momentum that post-election EIRs risked being 
turned into exactly the type of "post-hoc rationalization" 
disapproved of by the courts. We discuss some of the evidence 
of that political momentum below. 
Under CEQA, a project cannot be approved before an EIR is 
completed and certified. The day after the election that 
approved the 4gers stadium, even before all the votes were 
counted, the city agencies responsible for certifying completion 
of the EIR, the Planning Department and the Redevelopment 
Agency, seemed to publicly indicate a predisposition towards 
approval of the project as if the EIR were a formality.lo5 
104. See Carla Marinucci & Gregory Lewis, Foes Say Team Spent $33 a Vote to 
Carpet Bomb City, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 4, 1997, at AI. This article, pub-
lished the day after the election, estimated that "the campaign ended up with barely 
85,000 out of San Francisco's 411,000 registered voters." Id. The article also credited 
successful appeals to women voters as helping to seal the victory. The campaign litera-
ture targeting women emphasized the "50% discount shopping" that would be available 
at the new mall. One such piece queried "Why should the city support Propositiona D 
and F? New jobs, new stadium, and new hope for the Bayview - And 50% off." (Cam-
paign materials on file with authors). Of course, had an EIR been prepared prior to the 
vote, project proponents could still have tried to drown out any data on negative envi-
ronmental impacts with glossy mail pieces. For this reason, we suggest in the fmal 
section of this article that some information on environmental impacts be placed in the 
ballot handbook. The broader issue of campaign fmance is, however, beyond the scope 
of this article. 
105. See Gerald D. Adams, But City is Poised to Issue Approvals with Lightning 
Speed, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 4, 1997, at A15. According to the San Fran-
cisco Examiner, "San Francisco Redevelopment Agency Director James Morales said 
that, once assured the ballot measures have been approved, he will immediately rede-
ploy staff members to work on the stadium and mall .... " Id. "It is a high priority 
project," said Morales. Id. Sue Restor, attorney and urban environmental advocate 
criticized the department: "Planning has become a permit-processing department that 
wants to approve projects without modification." Id. 
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The push for both the stadium projects took place in the 
context of a very aggressive approach to planning in San 
Francisco. San Francisco Mayor Willie L. Brown, Jr. - dubbed 
''The Master Builder" by the local press106 - pledged to develop 
"every inch of ground that is not open space.,,107 In August, two 
months after the June election that contained the two 4gers 
measures, the San Francisco Chronicle reported on the mayor's 
tightening grip on the city's planning commission. The trouble 
was, critics reported, that "the mayor seems to be the only voice 
in city government when it comes to planning issues."l08 The 
article also reported that planning veterans said that "checks 
and balances have disappeared: If Brown wants something to 
happen, city agencies that in the past would have scrutinized 
projects closely now rush to see them approved. "109 
An account of the hearing in which the Ballpark EIR was 
approved by city agencies illustrates this point. An article by 
planning writer Gerald Adams in the San Francisco Examiner 
reads in part: 
Sternly instructed to do so by Mayor Brown, the joint 
Redevelopment Agency and Planning commissions duti-
fully pushed forward the San Francisco Giants' plan to 
construct a China Basin ballpark. ... 
106. See Rob Morse, Multifaced Mayor: A Citizen's Guide, SAN FRANCISCO Ex· 
AMINER, November 9, 1997, at AI. This name stuck and appeared a number of times in 
local papers. Columnist Rob Morse wrote of the "symptoms" of "Mayor Master 
Builder," which he described as, "Boulevards, museums, Taj Ma City Hall, and Willi-
gan's Island Theme Park. This is the classic case of the edifice complex, with overtones 
of Paris envy." ld. Ken Garcia at San Francisco's other daily paper quipped, "Guys 
like Bill Clinton want to deal with vague concepts like building a bridge to the 21st 
Century. Brown doesn't care where the bridge goes. He just wants to build it." Ken 
Garcia, State of City? State of Confusion, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 16, 1997, 
at A17. For a list of the many ambitious building plans laid out in the 95 minute State 
of the City address that sealed the Mayor's reputation as "Master Builder," see Matier 
and Ross, Brown's Ambitious To·do List for San Francisco Carries Hefty Price Tag, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 17, 1997, at A19. 
107. John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, August 8, 1997, at A17. "Mayors are known for what they build .... I 
intend to cover every inch of the ground that isn't open space." ld. 
108. ld. 
109. ld. 
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"San Franciscans normally deliberate and deliberate 
and deliberate and nothing gets done. That's not the 
way I operate," Brown said .... 
While commissioners may have been intimidated by the 
mayor's words, dissidents were not. Among some 50 speakers 
were critics who raised problems about traffic, parking, 
encroachment on South Beach Park, sidewalks in states of 
disrepair, poorly lit streets and threats to residential 
neighborhood quality. 
The fast-track nature of the ballpark review process is 
further demonstrated by a tailored statutory exemption for the 
Ballpark pushed through the state Legislature that allowed the 
Giants to begin preparation of the ballpark site - including 
relocation proceedings against tenants - before final approval 
of the EIR. l1O This not only further called into question the 
validity of the post-election ballpark EIR, but also invited an 
attempt to amend the bill with a flurry of unrelated CEQA 
exemptions from Republicans in the Legislature. 
For proof positive that the vote had a profound effect on the 
post-election environmental decision-making process, we need 
look no further than the Ballpark EIR's rejection of the "No 
Project" Alternative. CEQA "requires public agencies to deny 
approval to a project with significant adverse effects when 
feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures can 
substantially lessen such effects." One alternative - the "No 
Project" alternative - is required by CEQA to be considered in 
all EIRs.111 The possibility that a project might be rejected as 
too harmful to the environment is critical to the integrity of the 
CEQA process. 
In the terse two paragraph section labeled "Reasons for 
Rejection" [of the "No Project Alternative"] the EIR reads: 
110. See Steven A. Capps, Giants Ballpark Bill Passes Assembly, SAN FRANCISCO 
EXAMINER, April 8, 1997, at AI. The bill passed with a lopsided vote: 71-1 in the As-
sembly. 
111. See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126. 
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The No Project Alternative would not fulfill the man-
date of the voters of San Francisco in Proposition B to 
construct a ballpark on a China Basin site.ll2 
As with the Ballpark, the campaign for a 4gers stadium and 
mall blurred the lines between private project proponents and 
the city approving the project. The city's participation before 
and after voter approval was spearheaded by Mayor Brown 
himself. 113 It was his idea to add the mall to the stadium 
complex. 114 He played a defining role in the campaign for 
Propositions D and F, publicly stumping for it and encouraging 
city workers to walk precincts for it. Finally, he took an active 
role in shepherding the project through agencies for review, 
having his office handle the project directly.ll5 
This predisposition towards fast-track approval is written 
directly into Proposition F, which was placed on the ballot by 
the Mayor. Proposition F directed the San Francisco Planning 
Commission to "approve a conditional use permit for the 
stadium and mall no matter what flaws, if any, they find in the 
project. It must grant approval within 60 days of its first 
hearing on the projects.,,116 Normally, public hearings for such 
a large project could take a year. One local paper reported that 
veteran planners said they "have never known the commission 
to be so constrained by a time restriction.,,117 
VI.CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
In drafting the guidelines, the Resources Agency made 
efforts to ensure that, wherever possible, CEQA's procedures 
112. Giants Ballpark DEIR, VIII at 12. 
113. See John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, August 8,1997, at A17. The San Francisco Mayor cultivated his mastery 
of the development approval process during his years as Speaker of the Assembly when 
he also worked as a development attorney. See id. 
114. See Key Events in San Francisco 4gers' Bid for a New Stadium to Replace 
Candlestick, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 4, 1997, at A14. 
115. See John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, August 8, 1997, at A17. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. 
27
Rainwater and Stephenson: Too Late in the Game
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
426 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:399 
would not obstruct efficiency in government. To this end, it 
allowed that "the submittal of proposals to a vote of the people" 
is not to be considered a "project" as defined by CEQA, and 
therefore no environmental analysis needs to be done studying 
that submittal. This directive says that the purely ministerial 
act by a public agency of placing a proposal on the ballot -
where it has no other legal option - need not trigger the CEQA 
review process. 
Unfortunately, this narrow advisory in the guidelines has 
been misused in a way that clearly contradicts CEQA's central 
requirement that EIRs should be prepared ". . . as early as 
feasible in the planning process to enable environmental 
considerations to influence project program and design .... "118 
In cases such as the Giants Ballpark and the 4gers Stadium, 
project sponsors (in reality the city and private parties 
together) were able to largely avoid CEQA's requirement that 
"at the earliest feasible time, project sponsors incorporate 
environmental considerations into project conceptualization, 
design, and planning.,,119 
One remedy would be to remove the ballot measure 
exemption from the CEQA Guidelines in its entirety. Even 
when ballot measures are citizen-sponsored, voters should have 
a right to consider environmental analysis when deciding how 
to vote on an initiative. Or perhaps the exemption could be 
narrowed to only exempt more general citizen-sponsored 
measures,120 but not citizen-sponsored measures on specific 
development projects.121 
118. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004. See also Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. 
State Bd. Of Educ., 654 P.2d 168, 179-180 (Cal. 1982); Bozung v. Local Agency Fonna-
tion Comm., 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975); Mount Shasta Defense Committee v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 77 Cal. App. 3d 20, 35 (1978); Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union 
High Sch. Dist., 235 Cal. App. 3d 772, 780 (1991). 
119. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004(b)(1). 
120. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1980). 
121. A private project proponent could, of course, avoid early CEQA analysis 
through an "astroturf' paid signature drive for an initiative. This misuse could be 
avoided if specific development projects were barred from using the exemption. 
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At the very least, the Resources Agency should amend the 
guidelines122 to further clarify that the ballot measure 
exemption applies only to citizen-sponsored initiatives. As we 
discussed earlier, this was probably their intention in 
amending the section to include a citation to Stein. The Lee 
court, however, missed this amendment, underscoring the need 
for clarification. Alternately, local governments could pass 
resolutions and/or planning policies interpreting the guidelines' 
exemption for ballot measures to apply only to citizen-
sponsored initiatives, and requiring EIRs in cases where the 
project sponsors or local governments place the measure on the 
ballot. Certainly, some initial formal environmental 
assessment should be done. 
The Lee court's argument, that it would be hard to confirm 
that voters had considered the data, does not contradict the 
usefulness of the data to the whole electorate. For example, in 
San Francisco, many influential endorsing organizations would 
be able to make decisions based on that data, and voters would 
be able to take their recommendations into account.123 As well, 
some summary of whatever environmental analysis had 
occurred could be placed in the ballot handbook, much like the 
financial analysis that the handbook currently contains. 
CEQA's exemption for ballot measures was not meant to 
allow project proponents to make an end-run around the EIR 
process. The current misuse of this exemption is undermining 
the law's intent, namely, "that protection for the environment 
be the guiding criterion in public decision-making." If 
corrections are not made, we are sure to see more and more 
developers taking advantage of the exemption, ironically using 
122. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE 21087(a) (West 1996). The Resources Agency is now 
required to "certify and adopt guidelines, and any amendments thereto, at least once 
every two years." [d. 
123. In addition to environmental groups - San Francisco League of Conservation 
Voters, Sierra Club, and San Francisco Tomorrow - many of the dozens of Democratic 
clubs have dedicated activists who would be highly likely to look at formal environ-
mental analysis when making endorsement decisions. For example, the Harvey Milk 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Democratic Club - one of the most influential 
endorsements - has an environment committee that examines just these types of is-
sues. These organizations then distribute their recommendations via slatecards and 
grassroots electioneering. 
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the initiative process - originally intended to empower the 
citizenry124 to undermine public participation in 
environmental and land use planning. 
124. The ballot initiative was a centerpiece of the Progressive Party at the turn of 
the twentieth century. Envisioned as a way to allow the electorate to legislate directly, 
the idea was most popular on the West Coast. California adopted the initiative process 
in 1911, during Hiram Johnson's term as governor. See RANDY SHAW, THE ACTIVIST'S 
HANDBOOK (Univ. of California Press, 1996), for an overview of the history of and re-
cent campaigns around California ballot initiatives. 
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